Abstract. We show that the hierarchy of level r consensus partially collapses. In particular, any profile π ∈ P that exhibits consensus of level (K − 1)! around ≻0 in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻0.
The concept of level r consensus was introduced in [1] in the context of the metric approach in social choice theory. We will mainly use the notation and definitions of [1] . Let A = {1, 2, . . . , K} be a set of K > 2 alternatives and let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of individuals. Each linear order (i.e. complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) on the set A is called a preference relation. The set of all preference relations is denoted by P. The inversion metric is the function d : P × P → R defined by
(since all preference relations in P have the same cardinality we have also:
. Let ≻ 0 be a preference relation in P. A metric on P allows to determine which one of any two preference relations is closer to a third one. This comparison can be extended to equal-sized sets of preferences.
Definition 1 Let C and C ′ be two disjoint nonempty subsets of P with the same cardinality, and let ≻ 0 ∈ P be a preference relation on A. We say that C is at least as close to ≻ 0 as C ′ , denoted by C ≥ ≻0 C ′ , if there is a one-to-one function φ :
, with strict inequality for at least one ≻∈ C.
Using the concept of closeness the authors define the correspondence between preference profiles π ∈ P n and preference relations ≻∈ P depending on a natural parameter r called "preference profile π exhibits consensus of level r around ≻".
For any π = (≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n ) ∈ P n , ≻∈ P, and C ⊆ P
Definition 2 Let r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
K!
2 }, and let ≻ 0 ∈ P. A preference profile π ∈ P n exhibits consensus of level r around ≻ 0 if 1. for all disjoint subsets C, C ′ of P with cardinality r,
Proposition 1 of [1] states that the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of level r + 1 around ≻ 0 extends the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of level r around ≻ 0 . Thus, each preference relation ≻ 0 determines the hierarchy of preference profiles.
Let a preference profile π exhibit consensus of level r around ≻ 0 . We call ≻ 0 a level r consensus relation of π and simply consensus relation of π if r = K! 2 (the level K! 2 is the maximum level for which this concept is nontrivial). A level r consensus relation ≻ 0 of profile π may be considered as one of probable social binary relations on the profile π. Theorem 1 of [1] states that if n is odd, then each profile π have at most one consensus relation ≻ 0 and the consensus relation ≻ 0 coincides with the relation M π assigned by the majority rule to π. This result gives an interesting sufficient condition for transitivity of M π . Furthermore, regardless of parity of n, the ≻ 0 -largest element a 1 is a Condorcet winner on π.
For small values of r, level r consensus relations ≻ 0 of profile π have some interesting additional properties. Namely, the largest element a 1 with respect ≻ 0 is selected by any scoring rule. A scoring rule is characterized by a nonincreasing sequence S = (S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S K ) of non-negative real numbers for which S 1 > S K . For k = 1, 2, . . . , K, each individual with the preference relation ≻ assigns S k points to the k-th alternative in the linear order ≻. The scoring rule associated with S is the function V S : P n → 2 A whose value at any profile π = {≻ 1 , ≻ 2 , . . . , ≻ n } is the set V S (π) of alternatives a with the maximum total score (i.e. with the maximum sum 1≤i≤K S ki where k i is the rank of a in ≻ i ). Theorem 2 in [1] claims that if a preference profile π exhibits consensus of level r ≤ (K − 1)! around ≻ 0 , then the ≻ 0 -largest element a 1 belongs to V S (π) for all scoring rules V S .
However, the authors did not notice some combinatorial properties of the concepts introduced. We show that the hierarchy of preference profile partially collapses. In particular, any profile π ∈ P that exhibits consensus of level (K −1)! around ≻ 0 in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻ 0 . Thus, it would be desirable to slightly adjust the assumption of Theorem 2 of [1] .
Theorem 1 For any natural number K > 2 there is a natural number c ≤
such that for any natural numbers n ≥ 1 and r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
2 − c}, any preference profile π ∈ P n , and any linear order ≻ 0 ∈ P the following conditions are equivalent 1. π exhibits consensus of level r around ≻ 0 2. π exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻ 0 .
Proof. The implication 2 → 1 follows from Proposition 1 of [1] . We will prove the reverse implication. Let ≻ 0 be a linear order in P and let
for any natural number k. Obviously, |P k (≻ 0 )| coincides with the number of permutations of {1, 2, . . . , K} with k inversions, i.e. with the Mahonian number T (K, k) (sequence A008302 in OEIS, see [2] ). The set P K(K−1) 2 contains exactly one element. We denote this element by ≻ 0 :
Let c
′ be the number of k for which T (K, k) is odd:
is the maximum distance between the linear orders in P. Moreover, c ′ is even because
. Then the inequality c ≤
holds.
Definition 3 For any natural number m a pair
Proof. Note that T (K, k) ≥ 2 for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
− 1} (this follows, for example, from a recurrence formula for T (K, k), see [2]). Using this fact, for each k ∈ {k ∈ N : T (K, k) ≡ 1 (mod 2)} choose a preference relation
For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,
Obviously, items 1-3 of Definition 3 hold. Lemma 2 is proved.
Lemma 2 For any natural number m and m-balanced pair (C 1 , C 2 ) there is a one-to-one function φ :
for all ≻∈ C 1 .
Proof. By item 3 of Definition 3 for any k = 0, 1, . . . ,
there is a one-to-one mappings φ k :
Obviously, we can put φ = 0≤i≤
Corollary 1 For any natural number m and m-balanced pair (C 1 , C 2 )
Proof. Let φ be a function from Lemma 2. Then
for all ≻∈ C 2 , and it remains to recall Definition 1.
Let π ∈ P n and let π exhibit consensus of level r ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
Our next goal is to prove that item 1 of Definition 2 holds for the profile π and r = 1.
2 ) for which ≻ 2 ∈ C 1 and ≻ 1 ∈ C 2 , and a on-to-one function φ :
for all ≻∈ C 1 . By Definition 2 and Corollary 3 we have
Let
Since (∀C ⊆ P) µ π (C) = ≻∈C µ π (≻), we have
Then by (1), (2) and (3)
and, finally,
For further discussion, note that this implies
for all different ≻ 1 , ≻ 2 ∈ P.
Consider the remaining cases.
. Reasoning as before we have
In the case ≻ 2 = ≻ 0 and ≻ 1 =≻ 0 , the arguments are similar. In the latter case ≻ 1 =≻ 0 and ≻ 2 = ≻ 0 . We can choose a preference relation ≻ * ∈ P \ {≻ 0 , ≻ 0 }. According to the above, we have
Lemma 3 is proved.
To prove the theorem it remains to show that item 2 of Definition 2 holds for the profile π and r = 1. Assume µ π (≻ 0 ) = ∅. Then, for every preference relation ≻ of profile π we have d(≻, ≻ 0 ) > d(≻ 0 , ≻ 0 ) and µ π (≻) > µ π (≻ 0 ).
In the opposite case, assume that item 2 of Definition 2 is not hold for the profile π and r = 1. Then by Lemma 3 the profile π contains the same number of all linear orders in P. Thus, π does not exhibit consensus of any level, a contradiction.
Theorem 1 is proved.
Corollary 2 Let profile π exhibit consensus of level (K − 1)! around ≻ 0 . Then π exhibits consensus of level 1 around ≻ 0 .
Proof. Let K ≥ 4. Then it suffices to prove the inequality
This is easily by induction. For K = 3 we can use the sufficiency of inequality
(for K = 3 we have |{k : T (3, k) = 1 (mod 2)}| = 2).
